AN ANATOMY OF THE RECENT ANTI ETHNIC-CHINESE RIOTS IN INDONESIA
Somewhere in Southeast Asia, 20 March, 1998.
by: Michael Ocorandi.
1. Recent manifestations against ethnic-Chinese in Indonesia took
two forms. Firstly, Muslim activists stepped up pressure against Sofyan
Wanandi, an ethnic Chinese Indonesian, accusing him of financing a
student movement to topple the government. This was political/religious
in nature. Secondly, a wave of economically motivated riots directed
against ethnic-Chinese Indonesian swept 40 towns across the archipelago.
The crusade against Wanandi.
2. In order to understand the crusade by Muslim activists against
Sofyan Wanandi, one should go back to 1965. In 1965, after the attempted
coup in by communists in which six top anti communist generals were
brutally murdered (Suharto miraculously escaped the grisly massacre as
he went fishing all night), a coalition was born consisting of students
associated with the Catholic/Chinese, the Protestant and the Muslim
student association (the PMKRI, the GMKI and the HMI). These students
launch anti Sukarno and anti communists demonstrations. They were
backed by the anti-communist army led by Suharto, and tacitly supported
by the USA. The daily student demonstrations backed by the army,
finally brought down Sukarno, on 11 March 1972. It is no coincidence
that this year Suharto was re-elected on 11 March 1998. In the process,
pogroms by anti-communist people massacred 500,000 to 800,000 members of
the communist party and their wives and children, including babies.
3. CNN has not yet gone worldwide and anyway little mention was made
in the press because the "good guys" slaughtered the "bad guys". There
was also the six days war at the same time. Suharto was patted in the
back by the US for getting rid of the communists and doing a great favor
to the free world. Nobody in those days talked about democracy or human
rights as long as the abuse was directed against communists. Because of
the alleged role of China in the aborted coup, with whom the Communist
Party of Indonesia (PKI) was affiliated, a drive against Chinese culture
took place. Chinese written language was not allowed in public, the
celebration of Chinese New Year and other festivals were banned and the
ethnic-Chinese Indonesians were strongly "persuaded" to adopt Indonesian
names.
4. Meanwhile, although the Catholic students constituted just a
small fraction of the Muslim students and masses, their role became all
important as, under the tutelage of a staunch anti-communist Dutch
priest Romo Beek, they mapped out the strategy of attack, and provided
Suharto's's army and the students and masses with valuable data on
communists and communist suspects from their data base, benefitting from
the network of Catholic churches throughout Indonesia. Suharto rewarded
this group with many privileges. Their leaders, including the brothers
Yusuf and Sofyan Wanandi, (Lim Bian Kie and Liem Bian Koen) were given
economic and political privileges while the think tank established by
the group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies provided
intellectual backstopping for the Suharto government and became all
powerful under General Ali Moerdopo, backed by Catholic General Benny
Moerdani. Many Muslims felt disadvantaged by Suharto who listened more
to this group than to the Muslims under the principle that Indonesia is
a secular and not a Muslim state. Habibi, a bright scholar returning
from studies in Germany, and last week named Vice President, tried to
correct the balance by establishing the ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim
Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) in 1990.
Nevertheless, CSIS continued to flourish as a think tank but Suharto
listens more and more to Habibi and the Muslims.
5. Gradually, CSIS and its leaders became more and more critical of
the way the Suharto government ruled. As the economy progressed at a
rapid pace, it was accompanied by ever escalating privileges and
monopolies for Suharto's family and Chinese conglomerates. CSIS, the
principal backer of Suharto against Sukarno, quietly opposed the
government. On January 26, 1998 the Jakarta military command alleged
that Sofyan Wanandi was tied to a bomb blast involving students
associated with the outlawed People's Democracy Party. He was brought in
for questioning while more than a hundred students wearing Ararat style
scarves and white caps demanded that CSIS be closed down. Jakarta's
military commander, Syafrie Syamsuddin, said that an E-mail was found in
a laptop proving the link. Meanwhile, other prominent Muslim
personalities also stepped up the campaign against Sofyan and other
Chinese tycoons at a huge rally at Sunda Kelapa mosque in Jakarta. At
the rally outspoken anti ethnic-Chinese Indonesians like Adi Sasono,
Husein Umar, Sri Eddy Swasono and Achmad Tirtosudiro condemned
ethnic-Chinese Indonesians. A close aide to Suharto, General Syarwan
Hamid, who is considered a hard liner, also spoke against the need to
eradicate rats (obviously referring to ethnic-Chinese Indonesians). The
powerful but moderate Amien Rais, leader of the 28 million strong
Muhammadiah, a staunch government critic and not a known anti-Chinese,
reminded Syarwan that there are all kinds of rats, including big rodents
(tikus got).
6. Sofyan Wanandi, who himself is a wealthy businessman benefitting
from facilities awarded him by Suharto earlier denied the charges and
hinted that the questioning as well as the media bashing against him was
an attempt to create the impression that all ethnic-Chinese Indonesians
are subversives. The 21st Century Islam Foundation, in Bandung claimed
that Muslims have no choice but to crush these conspiratory tycoons (
referring to ethnic-Chinese Indonesians) who even dare to say that they
will bring the rupiah down to 20,000 to the dollar if anti-Chinese
Habibi were elected vice president.
The food riots.
7. The ascendancy of Suharto to political power was accompanied by
rapid and uninterrupted economic development implemented by Suharto's
government. More pats on the back for Suharto from the US, joined in by
the World Bank and IMF. The oil boom helped a lot and the
liberalization of exchange control coupled with high interest rates
brought in an avalanche of private capital including hot money into
Indonesia. Suharto and his children, in cooperation with conglomerates,
most of them of Chinese descent, all got rich and gradually became
super rich. Resentment built up among the predominantly Moslem masses
against this privileged class associated with the Suharto family and
with ethnic-Chinese and with Christians in general. The Chinese are
either Christian or Buddhist/Taoists. Sporadic but sometimes violent
riots against Chinese/Christians took place throughout the postwar
period. During 1995-97, before the financial crisis, 131 Christian
churches were attacked and untold Chinese owned shops, cars and homes
burned and/or destroyed. However, during those days, resentment could
not dislodge Suharto from power as the rapid economic development
produced a trickle down effect and living conditions improved for the
poor, almost eradicating absolute poverty, while 20 million Indonesians
became middle class (more than the entire populations of Australia or
Malaysia each).
8. This continued until July 1997 when the financial crisis suddenly
erupted, and enormous capital flowed out of Indonesia, Thailand and
South Korea leaving these countries with a shattered exchange rate and
massive private foreign debts to cope with. All three became sick ( and
to a lesser extend Malaysia and the Philippines as well) but Indonesia
became mortally ill. This was because in Indonesia the economic crisis
was aggravated by political factors including the uncertainty
surrounding Suharto's illness in December and his political future.
Beginning with the devaluation of the Thai baht on July 2, 1997, the
currency turmoil quickly spread to most countries of East and Southeast
Asia. Since July, and until the first quarter of this year, currencies
of East and Southeast Asia have depreciated an alarming manner: the
hardest hit, the Indonesian rupiah by 78%, the Thai baht by 50% and the
Korean won by 42%.
9. After having enjoyed rising per capita incomes over a period of
three decades in which absolute poverty was almost eradicated, the poor
people suffered when the rupiah plunged from Rp.2,500 to the dollar in
July 1998 to Rp.10,000 today. Unemployment soared while the nine
essential commodities including rice skyrocketed in price. As if to add
insult to injury, an unusual drought this year produced a deficit of 3
million tons in rice production which had to be imported which also hurt
the farmer. Rice quadrupled in price while Sustagen baby formula moved
from 10,000 rupiahs to 60,000 rupiahs. Imported medicines disappeared or
became very expensive. It was very easy to blame this to the ethnic
Chinese who control the retail trade everywhere as nobody in rural
Indonesia has ever heard of the IMF or of massive private capital
inflows.
10. The riots against ethnic-Chinese Indonesians spread from one
town to the other and devastated Chinese property and churches in about
forty towns in January/ February of 1998. In Pamanukan, one of the
worst hit towns, on February 14, angry mobs targeted stores and homes
owned by ethnic Chinese Indonesians in sporadic looting, dumping
groceries, cookware and clothing into the streets despite police and
army patrols in the riot-torn town. The looting came a day after
hundreds of shops and houses in about a dozen locations were wrecked in
the worst violence since the onset of Indonesia's biggest economic
crisis in three decades.
11. Mobs were venting their anger against ethnic-Chinese Indonesian
traders they blame for the rising prices that came with mass
unemployment after the plunge in value of the rupiah. A heavy security
presence brought an uneasy calm to most trouble spots, but isolated
disturbances continued. In Patok Besi, a village about 50 miles east of
Jakarta, more than 200 looters ransacked a store owned by an ethnic
Chinese Indonesian. Some ran away with stolen goods. Others dumped wares
- the general stores sell everything from crockery to soap - into the
street as onlookers cheered and laughed. Police directed traffic close
by but did nothing to intervene. ``The Chinese have put up the prices of
everything way too quickly,'' one looter told The Associated Press.
In other towns, crowds picked through
wreckage and took away merchandise from shops abandoned by their
frightened owners.``All these economic problems are the fault of the
Chinese,'' said one man in Pamanukan, about 55 miles east of
Jakarta.``The Chinese keep raising prices,'' said another. ``We want the
government to lower prices.'' One ethnic-Chinese Indonesian storekeeper
wept as she surveyed the damage to her store. This picture was shown on
frontpages of newspapers all over the world.
12. Many ethnic Chinese-Indonesians hid in friends' homes or took
shelter in police stations. Other traders packed up and left, saying
they wouldn't return until the situation calmed. Eng Nori, an
ethnic-Chinese Indonesian woman, said a mob locked her and her two
children in a room for two and a half hours and ransacked her shop and
home in Sukamandi, 45 miles east of Jakarta. They escaped after the
looters left. ``We have to get out of town. But we don't know where to
go,'' she said with tears in her eyes. Riots took place in the
following towns: In Java: Jember, Tamanan. Kalibaru, Balung, Bagorejo,
Pakisaji, Kasiyan, Rembang, Kragan, Pamanukan, Jaiwangi, Kuningan,
Losari, Tanjung, Bulakamba, Sarang, Padangan, Tuba, Tambakboyo,
Margasari, Brebes, Jatirogo, Palang, Cirebon. In other islands: Ende in
Flores, Bima in West Sumbawa, Padangsidempuan in Sumatra, Ujungpandan,
Donggala and Kendari in South Sulawesi, and Praya in Central Lombok.
Riots did not take place in Hindu Bali, nor in Christian areas such as
Manado, Tapanuli, Kalimantan Dayak area, East Indonesia (Timor, West
Irian and Maluku). Ende is on Catholic Flores island but eyewitnesses
said that the 8 February rioting was perpetrated by a thousand Muslim
Florinese who burned down 21 shops and damaging or looting 71 others.
13. It was quite puzzling how these riots started. Many residents of
the rural towns themselves were stunned. Their ethnic-Chinese
Indonesian neighbors lived in their midst for generations, spoke
Indonesian and unlike in Malaysia, many spoke no Chinese at all. All
ate Indonesian food daily and have Indonesian names. It was under
strange circumstances that mobs suddenly appeared from nowhere. This
led to some suspicion: were they instigated and organized to deflect the
blame away from the government and onto the approximately 6 million
ethnic Chinese Indonesians? The instigation of rioters in small towns by
outsiders was evident by mobs showing up from nowhere to inflame locals
who were already upset with sky rocketing prices of essentials. Why did
the government not issue a warning against rioters and offered an
explanation that the economic hardship was not caused by local merchants
but was an externally induced crisis?
14. Diplomats in Jakarta points to signs of rising sentiments
against ethnic-Chinese Indonesians in some quarters in the Indonesian military.
Human Rights Watch, in a report, said that former armed forces commander
General Feisal Tanjung, now coordinating minister for Defense in the new
cabinet, and new army strategic reserve chief Lt. General Prabowo
Sugianto, a son-in-law of the president, and the leader of the military
parliamentary faction Syarwan Hamid, have incited racial tension by
hinting that: "any shop-owner who closes his shop for fear of violence
or refuses to sell at pre-crisis prices is deliberately making goods
scarce to keep prices high." The ethnic-Chinese Indonesians were accused
of jacking up prices and illegally stocking up on goods. The definition
of hoarding was arbitrary and left to the local police to define. This
led to great abuse. General Prabowo organized a buka puasa (break the
fast)event in which thousands of Moslem clergy were invited and anti
ethnic-Chinese rhetoric was the main course. The anti ethnic-Chinese
riots also took on anti Christian overtones. The total number of
churches destroyed by fanatical Muslims during 1995 to 1997 numbered
131. Another 37 were destroyed in the last riots.
15. It is strange that these riots abruptly stopped in mid-February
when General Feisal Tanjung, an Acehnese, was replaced by the more
moderate General Wiranto, a Javanese, as Chief of Staff. Both are
Suharto men but Wiranto was the only general who warned against all
riots, including SARA (religious, communal and ethnic conflicts). In
the new cabinet announced this week, Feisal Tanjung was named
coordinating minister for defense and Wiranto Minister of Defense.
Concomitantly, the massive campaign of food aid in which ethnic-Chinese
Indonesian conglomerates donated essential commodities in aid packages
worth millions of dollars to the most affected people in riot stricken
towns also helped to ease the tension.
16. Since then, the riots against ethnic-Chinese Indonesians gave
way to a wave of on campus student demonstrations, which were clearly
anti-government in nature and is still ongoing. Slogans called for
political reform and a lowering of prices. No slogans against ethnic
Chinese Indonesians were displayed or uttered. So far no ethnic-Chinese
property was destroyed by the students. It started on one campus and now
spreads across the entire archipelago. It was joined by professors
other intellectuals and the general public. Students are demonstrating
to alleviate the suffering of the people. They wear the same yellow
jackets as in 1965, their hallmark of protest. However, the situation
today differs markedly from 1965. Unlike in 1965, when the army was
solidly behind the students, the army today appears to be solidly behind
Suharto. So far the demonstrations have been confined in campuses but
during the last few days they ventured outside and were met by a phalanx
of army and police. Casualties started to fall which could alter the
situation.
The riots are a symptom of a deeper problem.
17. The immediate cause of the anti ethnic-Chinese riots was the
precipitous decline in the rupiah rate and the misery it caused through
skyrocketing prices and massive layoffs. However, the fact that the
ethnic-Chinese were easily being made a scapegoat has far deeper roots
in history. It is an interaction of legal, religious, cultural,
political, and economic factors dating back to the Dutch colonial times.
The legal factor.
18. The Dutch classified the ethnic Chinese as a separate group from
the indigenous Indonesians, requiring separate registration of birth,
marriage and deaths, schools, and even separate living quarters from the
native Indonesians. After independence, there is a problem of dual
nationality as China continued to recognize the ethnic Chinese as
Indonesians. In April 1955, a Sino-Indonesian dual nationality act was
signed to solve the problem. In the implementation of this act, during
a two year period, January 1960 to January 1962, those who were
considered to have dual nationality had to chose between citizenship of
China or Indonesia. According to estimates, 65 to 70 % opted for
Indonesian citizenship. After the abortive coup of 1965, in which China
was suspected of having played a role, the Chinese were virtually forced
to adopt Indonesian names and Chinese culture was discouraged or even
banned. However, problems relating to citizenship continued to surface
which caused the Suharto government to unilaterally abrogate the treaty
in 1969. It should be remembered that diplomatic relations between
China and Indonesia were frozen as a result of the 1965 abortive coup
d'etat. On 8 August, 1990, to mark the restoration of relations between
the two countries, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to settle the
citizenship of 300,000 ethnic Chinese still holding Chinese citizenship.
Thus the issue of dual citizenship was finally resolved, at least on
paper.
The cultural factor.
19. Culturally, ethnic-Chinese in Indonesia can be distinguished
between totoks and peranakan. The totoks are those who are not of mixed
descend, whose families have been in Indonesia for two or three
generations, have had Chinese language The education and cultural
orientation, and speak Mandarin or one of the dialects. By occupation
most of these totoks are in business and trade. Culturally, they
resemble the Chinese population in Malaysia. A lot of those who opted
for Chinese citizenship belong to this group. The peranakan, which
constitutes the majority of ethnic-Chinese, are those who are of mixed
descent, and whose families have settled in Indonesia for at least three
generations. They are educated in Indonesian or formerly Dutch schools
and generally speak no Chinese. Their cultural orientation is more akin
to where they have settled: they speak Javanese in Central and East
Java, Manadonese in Manado, etc. By education many of them have a
university education and they are in the independent professions by
occupation, although a significant number are also in business and
trade. The shopkeepers affected by the riots are mostly in this
peranakan category. Because of the ban on Chinese culture after the
abortive cup in 1965, the distinction between the two groups have became
blurred.
20. The adoption of Indonesian names by ethnic Chinese, the rapid
revolution in media and TV and sports made possible by technology and
economic development, and the advancement of education were all positive
factors in race relations. An increasing number of the younger
generation middle class intermarry between ethnic-Chinese and pribumi
although difference in religion is often still a factor. Therefore
intermarriages are more common between Christians such as among the
Dayak population of Kalimantan and ethnic Chinese. Most new generation
ethnic-Chinese enjoy Indonesian pop songs and culture and speak without
any discernible accent, unlike their grandparents.
The Religious factor.
21. Unlike in Thailand or the Philippines, where the ethnic Chinese
share the same religion with the majority (Buddhism in Thailand and
Catholicism in the Philippines) the religious factor in Indonesia is
critical. The ethnic-Chinese are mostly Buddhist, Taoist or Christian as
distinct from the majority Moslem population. After the abortive 1965
coup, everyone was forced to adopt a religion and many Chinese flocked
to Catholicism or Protestantism. The relations between ethnic-Chinese
and pribumi (indigenous) Indonesians are never strained in Christian
areas such as Manado, Tapanuli, internal Kalimantan where the pribumi
are Dayak, West Irian, Maluku and Flores as well as in Bali where the
pribumi profess Hinduism.It is significant that no riots took place in
Christian areas nor in Bali. In the rest of Indonesia, especially on
Java, the majority of Moslems are tolerant and not fanatic in attitude
but a small minority is interested in establishing an Islamic state in
which Chinese domination over the economy will be wiped out. This was
evidenced by the rhetoric voiced from mosque pulpits and other fora by
powerful generals and Moslem lay leaders to instigate the masses against
"rats who are hoarding food and raising prices at will" The implication
was that shopkeepers were portrayed as subversive criminals and rioting
against criminals is not a crime.
The economic factor.
22. During the Dutch colonial period, the Chinese are already
recognized as middlemen and traders. They are generally more wealthy
than the peasants or workers or even civil servants. After independence,
this state of affairs continued and periodically, laws were adopted to
curb the economic power of the Chinese. Suharto, in order to promote
rapid economic growth adopted economic liberalization in which the
ethnic Chinese were unfettered. Per capita incomes grew steadily
thought three decades up to the financial crisis and there was a trickle
down effect. Indonesia produced a 20 million middle class population.
As the ethnic Chinese only constitute 3-4% of the population, even if
they all belonged to the middle class, (which is not true as there are
many poor ethnic Chinese indonesians as well), a significant number of
pribumi (indigenous) Indonesians have entered the middle class. This
was an important factor in harmonizing relations between ethnic-Chinese
and pribumi. In spite of the rapid progress made, the gap between rich
and poor remained and even widened with many of the rich and super rich
being of Chinese descent.
23. In the words of a young Muslim editor Fadli Zon: "The Muslim
majority is ready to face any challenge, as long as there is economic
justice. It is time for the 87% Muslim majority to seize the reins of
an economy from a community that accounts for a mere 3% of the country's
200 million people. Time to construct a New Economic Policy that could
go further than the Malaysian model in promoting the indigenous race.
Time, too, for the military to help assert the rights of the nation's
Muslims.
24. The sudden and severe economic crisis starting in July last year
bewildered everybody. In particular the poor and the blue and white
collar workers who were laid off. The silence of the government was
deafening. It neither condemned the riots nor did it offer an
explanation that the steep price hikes and unemployment was not the work
of small local shop owners but was a consequence of the sudden and steep
decline in the exchange rate as a result of an externally induced
crisis.
Political factors.
25. Political factors worked both against and for the ethnic-Chinese.
The disproportionate importance given by Suharto to the CSIS dominated
by Chinese Catholics and supported by powerful non-Chinese army generals
was a thorn in the eye of the Moslems. Thus anti-government sentiment
was often mixed with anti-Chinese and anti-Christian rhetoric. In order
to please these groups, the secular Suharto gave in to powerful Moslem
demands by giving them more control and power. The rise of Habibi, an
intellectual educated in Christian schools in Germany, who established
the ICMI, was an example. There was also evidence of deflection of the
peoples' anger away from Suharto and to the ethnic-Chinese. However, as
the ongoing student demonstrations show, their anger is distinctly
directed against the government.
26. A solution requires a conscious effort by all concerned.
Unfortunately, such efforts will now fall by the wayside because of the
preoccupation of government and businessman alike with the financial
crisis. Since the current riots were induced by the financial crisis,
a solution of this crisis being worked out between the IMF and the new
Indonesian government will be very important for the survival of the
Indonesian economy. On the other hand, the continued sufferings and
layoffs of workers will cause further social unrest and further riots
with unpredictable outcome for the fate of the ethnic-Chinese
Indonesians.